The Pret a Voter election scheme provides high assurance of accuracy and secrecy, due to the high degree of transparency and auditability. However, the assurance arguments are subtle and involve some understanding of the role of cryptography. As a result, establishing public understanding and trust in such systems there remains a challenge. It is essential that a voting system be not only trustworthy but also widely trusted. In response to this concern, we propose to add a mechanism to Pret a Voter to generate a conventional (i.e. human readable) paper audit trail that can be invoked should the outcome of the cryptographic count be called into question. It is hoped that having such a familiar mechanism as a safety net will encourage public confidence. Care has to be taken to ensure that the mechanism does not undermine the carefully crafted integrity and privacy assurances of the original scheme. We show that, besides providing a confidence building measure, this mechanism brings with it a number of interesting technical features: it allows extra audits of mechanisms that capture and process the votes to be performed. The mechanism proposed also has the benefit of providing a robust counter to the danger of voters undermining the receiptfreeness of property by trying to retain the candidate list. Furthermore, we show how the paper audit trail can be extended with cryptographic elements that ensure the integrity of the paper trail and allow for the safe use of voting machines with a touchscreen user interface. 
Introduction
There has been much concern lately as to the trustworthiness of electronic voting systems such as touch screen devices, where the integrity of the count depends heavily on the correctness of the code running on the voting machines. Researchers have pointed out the ease with which the count could be manipulated in virtually undetectable ways, [7] . One response to these concerns, originally proposed by Mercury [9] , is to incorporate a Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail, essentially a paper copy of the voter's intent that is printed in the booth and checkable by the voter. Whilst such a mechanism is doubtless an improvement on the situation in which the count is retained solely in software, with no paper back-up at all, there are still problems:
• Paper audit trails are not invulnerable to corruption.
• If the paper record does not agree with the voter's selection, it may be tricky to resolve, especially without undermining the privacy of the ballot.
• It is not clear under what circumstances the audit trail should be invoked.
• It is not clear how any conflicts between the computer and paper audit counts should be resolved.
• Humans are notoriously bad at proof-reading, especially their own material, and hence bad at detecting errors in a record of their choices, [3] .
An alternative response is to devise schemes that provide high levels of assurance via a high degree of transparency and with minimal dependency on technology. Such schemes provide Voter-verifiability in a different sense: voters have a way to confirm that their vote is included in a universally auditable tabulation that is performed on an append-only Web Bulletin Board (WBB).
Prêtà Voter, [16, 17, 1, 14] , is a particularly voterfriendly example of such high assurance, trustworthy voting schemes. It aims to provide guarantees of accuracy of the count and ballot privacy that are independent of software, hardware etc. Assurance of accuracy flows from maximal transparency of the process, consistent with maintaining ballot privacy.
Verifiable schemes like Prêtà Voter, VoteHere, [10] , and PunchScan, [5] , arguably provide higher levels of assurance than even conventional pen-and-paper elections, and certainly far higher assurance than systems that are dependant on the correctness of (often proprietary) code. However, the assurance arguments are subtle and it is unreasonable to expect the electorate at large to follow them. Whether the assurances of experts would be enough to reassure the various stakeholders is unclear. This is probably especially true during the early phase of introduction of such systems until a track record has been established. It seems sensible therefore to explore the possibility of incorporating more conventional mechanisms to support public confidence.
Randell and Ryan, [12] , explored the possibility of voter-verifiable schemes without the use of cryptography. This tried to achieve similar integrity, verifiablity and privacy goals but using only more familiar, physical mechanisms such as scratch strips. The resulting levels of assurance, in the technical sense, are not as high as for Prêtà Voter.
A more recent proposal is ThreeBallot due to Rivest, [13] . This does indeed provide voter-verifiability but at the cost of a non-trivial voter interface: voters a required to mark three ballots with in such a way as to encode their vote (two votes against their candidate of choice, one against all others) and to retain one ballot, chosen at random. Besides the non-trivial voter interface, a number of vulnerabilities in ThreeBallot have been identified, several identified in Rivest's original paper. It is probably fair to conclude that ThreeBallot, whilst being a conceptual breakthrough, does not, as it stands, provide a viable scheme for real elections.
Here we explore a rather different route: supplementing a cryptographic scheme with a conventional paper audit trail backup. Introducing such a mechanism may introduce certain vulnerabilities not present in the original scheme. However, it may be argued that it is worth introducing such risks, at least during trials and early phases of deployment. In this paper we propose an approach that we believe minimises such risks whilst maximising the reassurance of having a conventional mechanism as a backup. Once sufficient levels of trust and confidence have been established in a verifiable, trustworthy schemes like Prêtà Voter, we would hope that the scaffolding of a human-readable paper audit trail could be cast aside.
An additional and unexpected benefit of the approach of this paper is to provide a robust counter to the coercion threats arising from voters attempting to leave the polling station with the left hand element of the Prêtà Voter ballot. This shows the candidate order and so could provide a potential coercer with proof of the vote. A number of possible counter-measures to this threat have been identified previously, for exObelix Idefix Asterix Panoramix 7304944
Figure 1. Prêtà Voter ballot form
ample the provision of decoy candidate lists, but the mechanism here appears to be particularly robust. The second author previously proposed a Verified Encrypted Paper Audit Trail (VEPAT) mechanism, [18] . Whilst this enhances assurance from a technical point of view, the audit trail is not human-readable and so it does not really help with public perception and confidence. It is hoped that the scheme proposed here should be more familiar and understandable.
The contents of this paper
In Section 2 we introduce the background to Prêtà Voter and the tools used in the proposed scheme, detailed in Section 3. An extension for use in the touch screen setup is introduced in Section 4 and a brief discussion concludes in Section 5.
Outline of Prêtà Voter
The key innovation of the Prêtà Voter approach is to encode the vote using a randomised candidate list. Suppose that our voter is called Anne. At the polling station, Anne chooses at random a ballot form sealed in an envelope; an example of such a form is shown in Figure 1 .
In the booth, Anne extracts her ballot form from the envelope and makes her selection in the usual way by placing a cross in the right hand column against the candidate of her choice (or, in the case of a Single Transferable Vote (STV) system for example, she marks her ranking against the candidates). Once her selection has been made, she separates the left and right hand strips along a thoughtfully provided perforation and discards the left hand strip. She is left with the right hand strip which now constitutes her privacy protected receipt, as shown in Figure 2 .
Anne now exits the booth clutching her receipt, registers with an official, and casts her receipt. Her receipt is placed over an optical reader or similar device that records the random value at the bottom of the strip and records in which cell her X is marked. Her original, paper receipt is digitally signed and franked and returned to her to keep. The randomisation of the candidate list on each ballot form ensures that the receipt does not reveal the way she voted, so ensuring the secrecy of her vote. Incidentally, it also removes any bias towards the candidate at the top of the list that can occur with a fixed ordering.
The value printed on the bottom of the receipt, that we refer to as the onion, is the key to extraction of the vote during the tabulation phase. Buried cryptographically in this value is the information needed to reconstruct the candidate order and so extract the vote encoded on the receipt. This information is encrypted with secret keys shared across a number of tellers. Thus, only a threshold set of tellers acting together are able to interpret the vote encoded on the receipt.
After the election, voters (or perhaps proxies acting on their behalf) can visit the secure Web Bulletin Board (WBB) and confirm their receipts appear correctly. Once any discrepancies are resolved, the tellers take over and perform anonymising mixes and decryption of the receipts. All the intermediate stages of this process are committed to the WBB for later audit. Various auditing mechanisms are in place to ensure that all the steps, the creation of the ballot forms, the mixing and decryption etc are performed correctly. These are carefully designed so as not to impinge on ballot privacy. Full details can be found in, for example, [19] 
Prêtà Voter 2005 and 2006
The original Prêtà Voter system used a decryption mix network to break the link between an encrypted receipt and the plaintext vote [1] . We call this configuration of the system Prêtà Voter 2005. When the decryption mix network was exchanged for a reencryption mix network in Prêtà Voter 2006 [15] this made provisions for a range of measures that protect the secrecy of the election, for example the on-demand printing of ballot forms in the booth. A further extension of the system exchanged the Elgamal encryption for Paillier [14] .
The addition of the paper audit trail proposed here is made to Prêtà Voter 2006 and thus leaves in place all the desirable properties of this system whilst making use of the re-encryption properties of either Elgamal or Pallier.
Human readable paper audit trail
Whilst there appear to be sound technical arguments to show that cryptographic voting schemes like Prêtà Voter can provide higher levels of assurance of accuracy than traditional paper ballot systems, it is often argued that a paper trail that can be manually counted by humans should be available if the wish to do a manual recount arises. It should be recognised though that hand counting paper ballots will inevitably involve some degree of error, even ignoring the possibility of malicious manipulation of ballots. It is extremely rare for recounts to yield the same result. Typically such errors fall comfortably within the winning margin so are not a cause for concern. This does however mean that it would be unreasonable to expect an electronic and hand count to agree exactly, even if we suppose the electronic count were exact.
The voter verifiability of Prêtà Voter allows all voters to check that their votes were recorded as intended by the electronic voting system and then the public verifiability allows any interested organisation or individual to check that all recorded, encrypted votes are transformed into countable plain text votes correctly. The latter is fully auditable because of the cryptography used but the previous is dependent on a certain number of voters checking their receipts on a web site. Introducing a paper audit trail allows a public check of a fairly large number of these receipts.
Cryptographically verifiable paper audit trail
When a paper audit trail is introduced it is of course the case that someone might tamper with the paper audit trail to lessen public trust in the electronic system. Therefore it is not simply a case of printing the plain text votes onto paper but that which is printed on paper must also be verifiable. In the proposed scheme we show how it is possible to devise a human readable paper audit trail such that each ballot form in that paper trail can be verified to be in the plain text output from the electronic scheme without jeopardising the secrecy of the election.
Threshold probabilistic encryption scheme
Prêtà Voter 2006 [15] uses Elgamal onions where the plaintext is encrypted under the public key of the tellers and a subset of these have to participate in the decryption. Thus, a threshold probabilistic encryption scheme is used in Prêtà Voter 2006 and we will use this primitive here also. This is to ensure that the trust is distributed among a set of parties. Thus for example, we might use a (20, 10) which means that the secret key is distributed amongst 20 tellers in such a way that any subset of at least 10 of them can perform he decryption. Any smaller set will be unable to decrypt or to obtain any useful information about the value of the key.
Plaintext equivalency test
A plaintext equivalency test (PET) is an algorithm which allows a threshold set of key share holders to determine that two (randomised) ciphertexts have the same plaintext and to prove this without revealing the plaintext or their key shares. Its use in the proposed scheme underpins a novel auditing approach to the paper trail.
Zero-knowledge proofs
Cut-and-chooose protocols involve generating surplus ciphertexts, auditing a randomly selected subset and discarding the audited elements, as their cover has been blown. A more subtle way of establishing confidence in a claim, for example that a given ciphertext really is an encryption of a claimed plaintext, is to use zero-knowledge proofs.
An interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP) is a protocol in which one party, the prover P, demonstrates the truth of a claim or knowledge of a fact to another, the verifier V, without V learning anything other than the truth of the statement or claim. Such protocols typically involve a sequence of random challenges issued by the verifier to the prover.
A typical example of such a protocol is the ChaumPedersen protocol, [2] that is designed to prove plaintext equivalence of a pair of ElGamal encryptions without revealing either the plaintext, the secret key or the re-randomising factor. This situation crops up where a server has performed a re-encryption on an ElGamal ciphertext and wants to prove the correctness without revealing either the plaintext or the re-randomisation factor.
Suppose that P presents V with a pair of ElGamal ciphertexts (y 1 , y 2 ) and (z 1 , z 2 ) and claims that they are related by a re-encryption. They can both compute w := z 1 /y 1 and u := z 2 /y 2 . Now the truth of the claim that they are related by re-encryption is equivalent to showing that (α, β, w, u) is a DDH tuple, i.e., ∃ x and k such that w = α x , u = α x·k and β = α k . Here, k is thought of as the secret ElGamal key and x the reencryption factor. Where the prover P is a mix server demonstrating plaintext equivalence, P will know the re-encryption factor x but not the decryption key k. The three step protocol follows the standard pattern for ZK proofs: P generates some fresh randomness, s, that serves to blind the secret and makes a commitment to s. V responds with a random challenge, c, to which P can respond in a way that verifiable by V , only if the secret value x exists and is known to P .
1.
s
Now V can check:
Informally, we see that the secret, random factor s chosen by P serves to conceal the secret value x from V . If P does not know x, or indeed, the claimed equivalence is false and such an x does not exist, it will be virtually impossible him, aside from an absurdly lucky guess, to respond to v's challenge value c with a value t that will pass V 's checks.
A variant of this protocol can be used to demonstrate the correctness of a claimed decryption of a given ElGamal ciphertext. Again, the proof can reduced to the proof of a DDH tuple. In this case, P knows k but not the randomising factor x so we simply interchange their role in the protocol. Suppose that we have the ElGamal ciphertext (y 1 , y 2 ) = (α k , m.β k ) and P claims that this decrypts to m . To check that m = m we require P prove that the tuple (α, β, y 1 , y 2 /m ) is a DDH tuple, which it will be if and only if m = m .
A similar protocol to prove correct decryption of a Paillier ciphertext can be found at [4] in the case in which the prover knows the randomisation. For Paillier it turns out that knowledge of the secret key allows the prover to recover the randomisation as well as the plaintext. Thus there is no need for a separate protocol for the case in which the prover is ignorant of the randomisation. This is in contrast to ElGamal, where knowledge of the secret key does not help recovering the randomisation.
The scheme
In this section we first present the Prêtà Voter ballot form with its onions and how they are created and printed. We then describe the on-demand printing of the candidate list and the method by which votes are 
The ballot form and its use
The ballot form is altered to have two pages. The bottom page has two portions. The left hand porion carries an onion and a serial number. The top page overlays the right column of the bottom sheet and carries another onion value. The top page has a carbon layer or similar on the back to ensure that marks applied to the top page transfer to the bottom page. The layout of the ballot form is shown in Table 1 . This means that when the top page is aligned over the right column of the bottom page the complete ballot form looks as shown in Table 2 . When the voter makes her mark in the right hand column of this complete form the mark is made on both pages.
The reader will notice that there are no candidate names printed in Table 1 . This is because we are incorporating the on-demand printing of ballot forms introduced in previous papers. When the voter has iden- Table 5 . The marked ballot form in two pages tified herself to the poll station workers she is allowed to randomly choose a ballot form such as that in Table  2 . At this stage onion L and onion R are concealed by for example a scratch strip so that they cannot be read by either the poll station worker nor anyone else at the polling station. The other value, serial, is noted in the register next to the voter's name. The voter takes the form into the voting booth where she makes onion L visible and then allows a machine to read this value. The machine obtains a decryption of the onion, as will be explained below, and from this computes the candidate list, which it now prints in the left column of the ballot form. The result is depicted in Table 3 .
The voter now makes her mark(s) on the form in the privacy of the voting booth and the result is exemplified in Table 4 . She then detaches the top page from the bottom and the result is shown in Table 5 . The voter places the page marked P OST into an envelope through which only the serial number is visible and then leaves the booth carrying the envelop and the top page, which will constitute her receipt. She now presents herself to the vote casting desk and hands over the envelop and receipt. The poll station worker has checks that serial is the same as the one previously assigned to the voter. Once this is done, the serial number is detached and discarded and the envelope containing the lower page is placed in the ballot box. The page marked RET AIN is scanned, a digital copy posted to the WBB and handed back to the the voter to keep as her protected receipt.
The serial number serves a dual purpose here: firstly it counters chain-voting attacks as suggested by Jones, [6] . Secondly, it serves to verify that the voter does not retain the lower layer of their ballot form. This is a useful spin-off of the HRPAT mechanism: in the standard Prêtà Voter, there is the possibility of the voter retaining the LH portion of the ballot form, along with her receipt, to prove to a coercer how she voted.
The relationship between the two onions
As in Prêtà Voter 2006 with on-demand printing, onion L is decrypted in order to reveal the candidate list that can then be printed onto the ballot form. In contrast to Prêtà Voter 2006, it is not encrypted under the public key of a set of clerks but, like onion R under the public key of the tellers. This is because onion R is a re-encryption of onion L , created at the time of printing the ballot form.
Creating the ballot form
We now present a mechanism for the distributed generation of the onion pairs that will be printed on the ballot forms. Throughout, we will use (exponential) ElGamal encryption and we will work in large subgroup of Z * p , of order q for which the discrete log problem is deemed intracable. p a (large) prime. The aim is to generate the entropy in a distributed fashion so that no single entity has access to this information. Consequently, no single entity can leak this information. Furthermore, kleptographic attacks, [8] , are avoided.
The first step is to generate a batch of Left Hand onions using a set of l clerks in such a way that each contributes to the entropy of the crypto seed and this remains encrypted throughout. Consequently the candidate list, which is derived from the seed, remains concealed and all the clerks would have to collude to determine the seeds values.
We assume a set of decryption tellers who hold the key shares for a threshold ElGamal primitive with public key: (p, α, β). These will act much as the tellers of the original scheme and will be responsible for the final decryption stage after the anonymising, re-encryption mix phase. This public key is known to the Clerks and are used in the construction of the ballot forms.
An initial clerk C 0 generates a batch of initial seeds s 0 i . These seeds are drawn randomly from a binomial distribution centred around 0 with standard deviation σ. σ would probably be chosen to be of order n, the number of candidates.
From these, C 0 generates a batch of pairs of onions by encrypting each s The remaining l − 1 Clerks now perform reencryption mixes and transformations on this batch of onions: each Clerk takes the batch output by the previous Clerk and performs a combined re-encryption along with an injection of fresh entropy into the seed values.
More precisely, for each onion of the batch, the jth Clerk C j generates a new, random valuesx and s and performs the following mix/transformation on each onion of the batch:
where
Thex denote fresh randomisation values drawn from from Z * p generated by the Clerk during the mix. Similarly thes values are freshly created random values except that these are again chosen randomly and independently with a binomial distribution mean 0 and standard deviation σ. Having transformed each onion pair in this way, the Clerk C j then performs a secret shuffle on the batch and outputs the result to the next Clerk, C j+1 .
Thus, each Clerk performs a re-encryption mix along with the injection of further entropy into the seed valuess.
So the final output after l − 1 mixes is a batch of onions of the form: {{(α xi , β xi R .γ −si )} where:
thus:
The final s i values will have binomial distribution mean 0 and standard deviation σ √ l. As the seed values, and hence the candidate orders, remain encrypted, none of clerks knows the seed values and only if they all acted in collusion could they determine the seed values.
Original Re-encryption
Printing authority These "proto-ballot form" can now be stored and distributed in encrypted form, thus avoiding the chain of custody problems mentioned above. The seed values can now be revealed on demand by a threshold set of the Registrars.
The output batch from each clerk is published on the web bulletin board and this re-encryption mix network can be audited, for example using partial Random Checking. The purpose of these checks is to ensure that all the clerks play according to the rules. We want to avoid the possibility of, for example, the last clerk simply injecting the encryption of a fresh seed value, unrelated to the output of the previous clerks. This would defeat the purpose of the distributed construction and allow this final clerk to know the seed value.
The result of these re-encryption mixes is a batch of encrypted onions which contain a random values that can only be determined if a threshold set of the tellers work together to decrypt the values. The process of creating the onions that has just been described is shown in Table 6 .
Printing of the ballot form
For the printing of the candidate lists on the ballot forms, there are two options: they can either be printed by a central printing authority in advance and then be distributed in a secure fashion to the appropriate places in the constituency or the full form can be printed by the machine in the voting booth. The first approach setup suffers chain of custody problems while the latter may allow the booth machine to learn too much.
Whoever is to print a form takes an onion L from the available ones and re-encrypts this twice to form onion R . This process should be secret, both onions should be printed onto paper and then onion R should be published on the web bulletin board in a shuffled position such that it is not possible to determine the pairing of onion L and onion R . If this printing is done by a single printing authority then this authority can print all ballot forms and then publish the onion R s onto the web bulletin board as a full, shuffled batch. As the onions are re-encrypted twice, random partial checks can be used to audit this process without revealing a full link between onion L and onion R .
Printing candidate list onto the form
When the voter enters the voting booth with her ballot form she allows onion L to be read by a booth machine. This can be facilitated by printing onion L as a barcode. The booth machine submits this onion to the tellers which work together to decrypt the contents and return this to the booth machine which is then able to print the candidate list in the left column of the ballot form. Each teller keeps its own copy of the entire, previously published, list of onion L s and when one has been decrypted it is marked as used by each teller. Each teller is thus sharing the responsibility of ensuring that only those encryptions that should be decrypted at a particular stage of the voting process is decrypted at that stage.
When the candidate list has been revealed to the voter she can make her mark(s) on the form. She now detaches the two pages and places the lower page in an envelope available in the booth. This envelop conceals the lower page leaving only the serial number visible. She now leaves the booth with the envelop and the upper page and presents herself to the voting officials. They verify that the serial number matches the one issued to her and, if so, the serial number is removed and the envelop is cast into the audit ballot box. The top page of the ballot form constitutes her encrypted Prêtà Voter receipt which is now scanned as usual and posted to the WBB. She retains the original to use this to check that the vote is included in the tally -by checking that it appears on the web bulletin board.
The decryption of the encrypted receipts
The encrypted receipts scanned in the polling station are published onto the web bulletin board and all voters are able to check that their receipts appear there. When all tellers are satisfied that the election has ended and all electoral rules have been followed they start the decryption process, which is shown in Table 7 . The first teller, T 1 , takes all encrypted receipts and injects the voter's choice(s) into the onion R , using the homomorphic properties of exponential ElGamal. We call the onion with the injected choice(s) onion I . Therefore:
The index number V indicates the position of the X on the receipt. The result is:
Thus, the I onion is the encryption of the V index minus the seed value. The offset φ of the candidate list printed on the ballot form is computed as φ := s (mod n), where n is the number of candidates. Thus, V − s (mod n) gives the index of the candidate chosen by the voter in the canonical numbering of the candidates.
No mixing is performed at this step: the I and R onions are posted side-by-side on the WBB. That each onion I is correcly formed w.r.t. onion R is thus universally verifiable. s is the seed hidden within the encryption.
We now perform a sequence of re-encryption mixes, performed by a set of mix tellers. Each mix teller takes the full batch of onion I s, re-encrypts each onion, shuffles the batch and outputs to the next mix teller. The output batch from each teller is published onto the web bulletin board. The last output batch we call onion In .
When all mix tellers have performed their reencryption mixes, the independent auditors confirm that the mixes have all been performed correctly. This might be done using partial random checking again or perhaps Neff's proofs of ElGamal shuffles, [11] . If the auditors confirm that the mixes are correct, we can proceed to the decryption stage. If problems are identified with the mixes, corrective actions can be taken. Thus, for example, if one of the mix tellers is identified as having cheated, it can be removed and replaced. The mixes can be re-computed from the point onwards and re-audited.
Once we are happy that the mixes have been performed correctly, a threshold set of the decryption tellers take over and cooperate to decrypt each onion In . No mixing is required at this stage and each step of the decryption can be accompanied with a ZK proof of correct (partial) decryption. The final, fully decrypted values can be translated into the corresponding candidate values using:
Where n is the number of candidates and π is the mapping that encodes the standard numbering of of the candidates.
Audit of the paper trail
There are now a number of strategies for auditing the election. One possible scenario is to perform a full, manual recount of the election using the HRPAT. In practise, due to inevitable errors with manual counting, this will differ from the electronic count, even if the later is exact and correct. If the difference is small and well mithing the winning margin, this could probably be disregarded.
An alternative scenario is to take a random subset of the HRPAT ballots and, for each of these forms, the auditor takes onion L and injects the V index to compute onion J , analogous to onion I previously described:
Of course, the J onions computed now will have different randomisations from the corresponding I onions computed previously. However, we that, as long as all computations have been performed correctly, the sets of onion I s, onion In s and onion J s contain the same plaintexts. In other words, The J onions should be related to the I by a re-encryption and shuffle. We could test this hypothesis by performing a full PET matching of the I and J onions or, perhaps more realistically, performing some spot checks on a random selection.
To audit a particular encrypted receipt the auditor asks the tellers to prove which onion I contains the same plaintext as the onion J it just computed. Using a plaintext equivalency test (PET) a threshold set of the tellers are able to prove, without revealing any secrets or the contents of the onion, which onion In in the published list of onions contains the same plain text as the onion J .
Candidate list auditing of used forms
The candidate list is printed on the bottom page, which is retained in the ballot box so we can check that the printing of the ballot form has been done correctly. We do this by checking: This can be done for a randomly selected subset of all ballot forms or, if needed, the whole set of ballot forms. We thus achieve a higher level of auditability of the printing of the ballot form than in previous Prêt a Voter schemes. Note that the checks here are directly applied to the forms actually used to cast votes, rather than to randomly selected forms that are then discarded in a cut-and-choose protocol. In practice we would probably want to retain such cut-and-choose audits of ballots forms before and during the election in order to detect problems early.
A DRE style interface
An interesting side effect of the introduction of this human verifiable paper audit trail is that because of the auditing of the printing of the ballot forms that have been used to cast votes, as shown in Section 3.8, it is possible to devise a Direct Recording Electronic device (DRE) type of interface, also called in short a touchscreen interface. In brief, this type of interface is where the voter uses a computer to form her ballot, perhaps by indicating her preference by tapping choices presented on a monitor.
Motivation
While DRE type voting machines are notoriously unsafe and unverifiable, they do have one advantage: voters are able to use them very easily. They recognise user interfaces from their personal computers and so forth. Also, answering a series of questions or making a series of choices on a series of screens by pressing the choice with the index finger is easier than most other input methods. Furthermore, these input methods can be made accessible (by reading out the choices to the voter wearing headphones, for example) and the machine can easily handle a large set of different ballot forms, races and elections. 
Risks
The first issue to note is that when a voter uses a DRE to construct the vote that will at some point be cast, it is in the nature of the process for the machine to learn the intention of the voter. In some cases this can be a threat to the secrecy of the election. If the DRE at any point learns the identity of the voter, or colludes with someone who knows the identity of the voter, the vote is no longer secret. In a case where the machine does not learn the intention of the voter its motivation to change the vote is limited as it can only change the vote randomly.
Another important threat to the DRE style setup is that the DRE may be able to insert a subliminal channel in receipts that it prints, i.e. print more data to the receipt than it is required to, in a way that cannot easily be detected by any other party than those colluding with the machine. For example, if the DRE is required to select random values these may in fact not be selected based on a random source but in such a way as to encode a message to a colluding party.
The Prêtà Voter DRE voting ceremony
The voter casts a vote using a DRE style machine by executing the following sequence of actions:
1. The voter identifies herself to poll station workers and a serial number is marked against her name
2. An onion L is selected at random from the published list and this is marked as used and stored together with the serial number serial onto some medium (e.g. smart card or mag stripe) which is given to the voter 3. The voter enters the voting booth and inserts the medium into the DRE 4. The DRE reads the onion L from the medium and submits it to the tellers 5. The candidate list(s) encapsulated in this onion is returned to the DRE 6. The DRE presents the voter with all the choices she is eligible to make 7. When the voter has confirmed all her choices the machine prints a filled-out ballot form as shown in Table 8 where onion R is a re-encryption of onion L 8. The DRE submits the encrypted receipt to the web bulletin board and discards all data in its memory 9 . The voter detaches the encrypted receipt from the HRPAT part of the form and places the latter in an envelope 10 . The voter presents the envelope to the polling station official who checks that serial visibly matches that assigned to this voter -if not required by legislation to remain intact, serial is detached and destroyed 11. The envelope is dropped into a sealed, transparent ballot box
Risk limitation
The risks of using DRE systems identified in Section 4.2 are limited somewhat by the auditing possibilities of the scheme presented here. Using the cryptographic relationship between the onion L , onion R and the candidate list we can determine that the DRE has not cheated in the printing of the candidate list as well as that it has not cheated in the placing of the voter's marks on either part of the ballot form.
To audit this the election authority may select a random subset of all submitted HRPAT ballot forms and ask the tellers to reveal the contents of onion L . Using the public key P K T of the tellers it can be checked that this does in fact correspond to the candidate list printed on the form. This has now proved that the voter has indicated her preferences based on the correct candidate list.
The auditors then go on to check that, as shown in Section 3.7, the voter's mark on the HRPAT ballot form is the same as the one on the receipt that the Re-encryption onion L mix network
O M3 All tellers Table 9 . Another re-encryption mix of onion L voter holds. The voter, of course, can check on the web bulletin board that the electronic copy of her receipt corresponds to the printed copy that she holds.
The probability by which a cheating DRE will be caught is thus related to the number of forms that are audited and the selection of the forms to audit can be made in such a way as to further minimise the likelihood that the cheating DRE will be able to remain undetected.
Discussion

Teller oracle mode
As with some previous Prêtà Voter schemes it is unfortunate, but a necessity, for auditing (and in this scheme also for candidate list printing purposes) for the tellers to be available in so called oracle mode. The availability of the tellers can be safeguarded by a set of tellers (T 11 , T 12 , T 13 ) emulating a single teller (T 1 ) in a threshold fashion. This is the focus of future research.
Voter choices differ between pages
As the voter must make her marks on the form in the privacy of the booth, it is possible for a malicious or coerced voter to introduce different marks on the two pages. To resolve this and to prove that the marks were made differently on each sheet by the voter the tellers can take the list of onion L s and run them through a reencryption mix to form a list of onion M s, as shown in Table 9 . It is then possible to use the PET strategy to prove which onion M contains the same information as the onion L , the extension of which is that the bottom page is valid but the voter's mark does not match. If the tellers, when prompted, find that onion L with the voter's choice B bottom does not have the same plaintext as onion R with the choice V top injected then they prove that onion L has the same plaintext as onion M to show that the marks are different on each of the pages.
Acknowledgements
